

MIXED MOVEMENTS AMONG RABAT PROCESS COUNTRIES

Analysis of Trends & Challenges – SOM Rabat Process
Malabo 17-18 November 2021

WORKING TOGETHER ON ALTERNATIVES TO DANGEROUS JOURNEYS

Socio-economic Impact of Covid

- On the one hand, It has **increased aspirations to move**. Supporting data only partially available mainly focused on the west African maritime route (+114% by September 2021 + most deadly maritime route)
- On the other hand, it has **limited capability to move** by reducing resources that people can invest in movement & making mobility more difficult, for example through increased border controls and more restrictive migration/asylum policies
- Whether Covid-19 was a factor in people's decision to leave. April 2021: it was not yet the case. As of June 2021 more often cited as a reason to move (between 25% and 30% of respondents migrants/refugees). The imperative of “understanding the journey before the boat”.

Possible responses

- Spelling out what social-economic inclusion means (documentation, laws/being known to and register by the State, access to key rights, clarifying obligations too)
<https://www.unhcr.org/global-compact-refugees-indicator-report> The success in the implementation of the two Global Compacts will reside in the vibrancy of its appropriation at the sub-regional level.
- Role of cities as 1st line responders, but limits when legal frameworks / capacities often do not exist – So how to enable the potential of municipal actors? Build on Africities Marrakech 2018 -> toward Africities 2022 Nairobi and to involve smaller cities and municipalities on the routes.
- Programmatic responses targeting the Youth and those more likely to move (including education, livelihoods, legal “migration” pathways).

Secondary impact of Covid

- Majority of migrants/asylum seekers in African Rabat process countries indicate that the **need for smugglers is increasing**. They also say that **smuggling fees are increasing**. So, basically, with increased demand, and few regular pathways - fees seem to be going up.
- And, finally, we see that covid-19, and the movement restrictions adopted to reduce the spreading of the disease, also seems to lead to the **use of more dangerous routes**.
- Situation of increasing dependency on smugglers, which often leads to **increasing vulnerability** and risk for refugees and migrants involved to be trafficked.


Other side effects partially linked to COVID

- More smugglers turn traffickers along this route.
- The geographic regions of Northern Mali, Southern Algeria, Southern Burkina Faso, Eastern Niger and Western Sahara have become trafficking hubs attracting new clients in spite of the known risks.

Possible responses

- Awareness raising programmes / communication with communities not just focused on South-North movements. Lessons learnt over last 4 years. What works and what does not... <https://seefar.org/news/research/exploring-migrants-trust-in-humanitarian-organisations/>
- The renewed impetus to combat trafficking & protect victims of trafficking. Implementing the whole 4th component of the JVAP.

Routes within Africa towards North Africa and Europe, and abuses along the route



Challenges in accessing data

- The challenges of monitoring flows at key land borders where no one can really be present
- The insufficient capacity to measure South-South movements
- The challenges of measuring secondary movements of refugees, including those linked to cuts in food aid and livelihood opportunities affecting, in particular the Youth
- The challenges of getting disaggregated data from Governments to design programmatic responses (causes & solutions)

Possible responses

- Working with and capacitating the four “nascent” AU entities in Rabat, Bamako, Tunis & Khartoum to produce analysis that will enable States to take evidence-based and route-based responses.
- Working with States on systems to generate the missing data and make systems more inter-operable and data comparable between countries.

Challenges in accessing people-on-the-move on key routes

- **The geography of protection incidents:** what we know/don't know

On this journey, no one cares if you live or die

- **3 constraints** to access key locations:

- willingness of the authorities

- security (persons of concern & staff)

- logistic & financial capacity + recent mapping of protection services:

<https://www.unhcr.org/60ded10b4/mapping-protection-services-victims-trafficking-other-vulnerable-people>;

<https://www.unhcr.org/fr/60ded10c4/cartographie-services-protection-victimes-traite-personnes-vulnerables>

Possible responses

- Improving humanitarian access
- The imperative to work with & fund in a sustainable manner more small local actors to enhance the reach-out along key routes

Forecast in Mixed Movements along RP countries

- The uncertain, precarious & deteriorating situation of refugees from Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria in some host countries & risks of further onward irregular movements.
- The risk of increase of internal displacement (Burkina Faso/Mali) and more IDPs turning into asylum seekers on the move (Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali) + monitoring assumptions about the future of IDPs in Niger.
- The possible dynamics and impacts on mixed movements of Ivorians in relation to the Abidjan Declaration on solutions for Ivorian refugees

Q4 2021 To watch

- Stabilization of refugee movements to Chad from Cameroon
- Possible repatriation of Nigerian refugees from Niger/Cameroon & the sustainability of these returns, as well as pace of voluntary returns to Ivory Coast
- Movements of Sudanese asylum seekers across North Africa
- Expulsions to Niger, Chad, Mali
- Evolution of the % of Sub-Saharan Africans in sea movements towards Spain/Italy

Thank you

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